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Abstract 
Bid protests are increasing, and the effectiveness for protestors is relatively 
high.  Bid protests delay receipt of needed goods and services.  They are costly to 
prevent and to adjudicate.  The purpose of this research is to better understand why 
bid protests are lodged by interested parties.  This research concentrates on meso-
level factors controlled by the acquisition team that affect the receipt of a bid protest, 
namely, the characteristics of the procurement, acquisition strategy decisions, and 
human factors.  Using an existing data set of 240 government source selections 
resulting from a survey of U.S. Navy contracting officials, a logistic regression model 
finds support for six antecedents.  This research implicates the importance of 
criticality of the procured item or service, the type of value procured (i.e., services 
versus goods), the use of oral presentations, protest fear, protest experience, and 
cost reimbursement contracts in receiving a bid protest.  Based on the findings, 
several managerial and theoretical implications are offered, in addition to promising 
paths for future research. 
Keywords:  Bid Protest, Source Selection, Justice, Government Contracting, 
Federal Acquisition 
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Introduction 
A central tenet of a public contracting system is to maintain the public’s trust 
via instilled integrity, fairness, and openness (Hawkins et al., 2016).  A bid protest is 
a corrective mechanism to ensure integrity and fairness by providing an interested 
party with a process to air complaints and obtain relief (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011).  
It is a written objection that can occur at any stage of the contract award process.  
Often, protests result from alleged errors or mistakes committed by the buying 
agency.  The most common errors cited in protests are: poorly written or vague 
contract requirements; failure to follow the process or evaluation criteria laid out in 
the request for proposals; unequally treating offerors, and failure to adequately 
document the record (GAO, 2014).  Said errors can result in unfair discrimination 
against an offeror, and thus, lost business.  Nevertheless, offerors also protest for 
opportunistic reasons such as to increase revenue, harm competitors, obtain 
competitive intelligence, prospect for protest viability, and negotiate a subcontract 
award (Maser and Thompson, 2010).  
Bid protests have become a substantial aspect of government procurement 
(Cibinic et al., 2011).  In 2016, 2,621 protests were received by the GAO (GAO, 
2016), double the number received in 2008 (Arena et al., 2018).  This number 
trended steeply upward from 2007-2011, then levelled.  “From FY2008-FY2014 total 
government spending, adjusted for inflation, decreased 25% while total protests 
increased 45%” (Schwartz and Manuel, 2015, p.8). Thus, protests as a percentage 
of protest opportunities (i.e., awarded contract actions) increased from .16% in 2008 
to .26% in 2016 (Arena et al., 2018).  Of those protest cases that made it to a 
decision from 2009-2014 (i.e., the few that were not dismissed, settled, or 
withdrawn), only 17% were sustained, but an average of 42% of all protest cases 
were effective (either sustained or resulted in corrective action taken by the buying 
agency prior to a decision).  The effectiveness rate for 2017 grew to 47% (GAO, 
2017).   
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Acquisition officials and end users loathe the receipt of a bid protest (Hawkins 
et al, 2016).  The potential to receive a bid protest drives agencies to incur 
transaction costs to: (1) prevent a protest by thoroughly documenting and 
substantiating proposal evaluations and trade-off decisions (Hawkins et al., 2016), 
(2) defend against an actual protest lodged (NASPO, 2013), and (3) take corrective 
actions.  Responding to a protest requires the agency to generate a statement of 
facts and a memorandum of law, and to gather all of the pertinent supporting 
documents such as the solicitation, evaluations, proposals, etc., for distribution to 
the GAO and, in some cases, the protestor’s legal counsel (Rumbaugh, 2010).  The 
GAO resolves 70 percent of cases within 60 days, but consumes 90 to 100 days to 
resolve the remaining 30 percent which are complex cases (Arena et al., 2018).  At 
best, an agency’s voluntary corrective action means the competition is reopened, 
and proposals are allowed to be revised necessitating further evaluations and 
delaying the contract award.  At worst, an authority such as the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) or Court of Federal Claims (COFC) sustains the protest, 
meaning that the procurement process must often start anew.  This adds even more 
time and delays the receipt of needed goods and services resulting in significant 
rework.  The end users bear costs as well since their requirements are delayed or go 
unfulfilled.  Bid protests are such a persistent concern that the U.S. Federal 
Government recently proposed legislation to impose a $350 filing fee do dissuade 
frivolous protests (Poling, 2016), and the GAO, for the first time ever, temporarily 
banned a frequent protestor, Latvian Connection, from federal contract awards 
(Mlinarchik, 2016).  Congress took a step further in its Conference Report for the 
fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that included a pilot 
program to test the effects of an unsuccessful protestor paying the government’s 
protest processing costs.  Additionally, federal government agencies (Camm et al., 
2012) and Congress (Arena et al., 2018) continue to commission studies to 
understand and mitigate problems.  Furthermore, state governments are not immune 
to the public’s concern for fair tendering; thus, they commissioned research of their 
own (Molenaar and Tran, 2015).   
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While some research downplays the impact of protests by emphasizing their 
relatively rare occurrence (Arena et al., 2018; Gordon, 2013), the buyer’s reaction to 
the bid protest system is to apply extraordinary effort to defend acquisitions against 
a protest.  Measures taken to avoid protests include: (1) added layers of reviewers 
and legal counsel to scrutinize every document (and revision thereto) of the source 
selection record, (2) added procurement lead time, (3) conducting additional rounds 
of discussions to allow offerors an opportunity to rectify weaknesses and 
deficiencies rather than eliminating them from the competitive range, (4) 
unnecessarily retaining offerors in the competitive range, (5) awarding more 
contracts than intended, (6) modifying existing contracts rather than conducting full-
and-open source selections, (7) shopping requirements to existing contracts for task 
order awards rather than conducting a full-and-open source selection, (8) utilizing a 
more objective, price-based source selection method such as LPTA rather than a full 
trade-off, (9) increasing the size of the acquisition team, and (10) offering more 
extensive debriefings.  Furthermore, practitioners continue to devise procedures to 
mitigate protests (Curry, 2018; Finkenstadt and Hawkins, 2016).  Together, efforts 
during source selections amount to an average $235,000 of transaction costs each, 
or 7.7% of the contract value  (Hawkins et al., 2016).  These burdens and costs are 
not trivial, which suggests that the bid protest system will continue to be 
controversial.     
Periodically, the GAO publishes a list of common infractions leading to 
sustained protests.  Such micro-level factors include: failure to follow the solicitation 
evaluation criteria; inadequate documentation of the record; unequal treatment of 
offerors; and unreasonable price or cost evaluation (GAO, 2014).  Certain meso-
level systemic characteristics could facilitate these micro-level mistakes.  
Surprisingly, however, few studies have examined the meso-level factors pertaining 
to the structure of an acquisition, the context of the procurement, and human factors.  
One study by Maser and Thompson (2010) found that protests are more likely in 
cases of: (1) more bidders, (2) smaller bidders, (3) a high value of the protested 
contract as a percentage of the protestor’s revenue, (4) contracts with long delivery 
times (i.e., extended lock-outs), (5) buying services, and (6) international winners.  
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But what other strategy decisions are being made by the acquisition team that 
contribute to an offeror’s decision to protest?  Other factors could include: the source 
selection method applied, whether oral presentations are conducted, whether 
sufficient procurement lead time is allotted, whether discussions were conducted, 
the size of the acquisition team, and the experience level of personnel involved.  
Further, do characteristics of the procurement affect an offeror’s decision to protest?    
In addition to the very practical utility of unveiling factors that may reduce or 
increase bid protests, perhaps greater value from investigating this line of logic is the 
extension of inter-organizational justice theory to pre-award supplier selection (i.e., 
not just pertaining to managing established post-award supplier relations).  After all, 
a bid protest is purportedly a manifestation of a supplier’s perceived injustice.  
Heretofore, justice theory applied to inter-organizational contexts is scant (Liu et al., 
2012) and has ignored a challenging stage of supplier relationships – relationship 
initiation (Dwyer et al., 1987).  However, the intersection of justice expectations and 
a competitive supplier selection presents a “sticky” situation in need of clarity.   
This research, backed by quantitative data, seeks to bridge this gap.  In doing 
so, all business-to-business/business-to-government (B2B/B2G) relationships stand 
to benefit by a better understanding of the specific phenomena leading to more 
efficient and effective supplier relationship formation (i.e., less perceived injustice 
and conflict).         
Research Questions and Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to better understand why bid protests are 
lodged by interested parties.  An objective is to identify various meso-level decisions 
and actions of buy-side acquisition teams that affect the receipt of a bid protest.  
Another objective is to seek extensions to inter-organizational justice theory based 
on the findings.  The following research questions (RQ) will be explored.   
• RQ1:  What characteristics of a procurement affect whether a bid protest is 
received? 
• RQ2:  What acquisition strategy variables/decisions affect whether a bid 
protest is received? 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 5 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
• RQ3:  What human factors contribute to receipt of a bid protest? 
• RQ4:  Are the pertinent theories surrounding inter-organizational exchange 
complete, and if not, what extensions should be considered?  
Research Scope 
This research examines only sources of bid protests attributable to buying 
organizations.  The scope excludes examining non-buyer sources of bid protests 
such as those lodged for reasons other than buyer action or inaction.  Allegedly, it is 
common for businesses to protest a contract award due to business strategy 
reasons such as to buy more time (i.e., revenue) on a service contract as an 
incumbent, to gain another chance to secure an otherwise lost business opportunity, 
or to disadvantage a competitor in some way.    
The remainder of this research is organized as follows.  First, the relevant 
literature is surveyed raising a conceptual framework and proposed hypotheses. 
Next, the the research design and methodology are explained. Then, the study 
provides an analysis of the proposed models and reports the findings.  Lastly, the 
study offers a summary discussion, offers implications for theory and practice, and 
concludes with study limitations and logical and useful vectors for future research. 
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Literature Review 
Bid Protest Evolution and Diffusion 
The United States government’s bid protest system evolved as a means to 
ensure fairness to taxpayers, whose resources should not be wasted, and to 
suppliers that relied upon the government for business.  Its origin traces to the 
Tucker Act of 1887; thereby, the government waived its sovereign immunity allowing 
it to be sued in certain contractual matters (Arena et al., 2018).  The U.S. 
Government Accounting Office was created in 1921 (Arena et al., 2018), and began 
hearing bid protests shortly thereafter with the first recorded decision in 1925 
(Gordon, 2013).  Eventually, the courts also gained jurisdiction to hear protests, 
currently the Court of Federal Claims.  An underlying theory of the bid protest 
system is equity; private firms should have an equivalent chance to secure 
government contracts (Arena et al., 2018). For protests filed at the GAO, relief is 
restricted to interested parties – those firms deemed to have direct economic interest 
(Cibinic et al., 2011) by being in a position for contract award given a sustained 
protest decision (Edwards, 2006). 
Bid protest systems for the deterence and relief of injustice are not unique to 
the United States federal government.  Their effectiveness in fostering integrity and 
fairness is so recognized that protests became part of international trade through 
forums such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, World Trade 
Organization, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, and the 
European Union (Gordon, 2013).  Nothwithstanding, most U.S. state governments 
allow for administrative bid protests without having to resort directly to a lawsuit 
(NASPO, 2013).          
Justice Theory 
Because of its importance, justice is receiving increased academic attention 
(Kaynak et al., 2015).  Perceived (in)justice affects key outcomes such as trust, 
satisfaction, commitment, and unethical behaviors (Greenberg, 1990), and has been 
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positively associated with alliance profitability (Beugre and Acar, 2008). Of the three 
dimensions of justice, distributive justice dominated early work.  Distributive justice 
represents an individual’s assessment of the distribution of outcomes (Gilliland, 
1993).  Interested parties often seek to ensure that outcomes are distributed among 
the parties fairly.  Commonly, the basis of those assessments is equity – a 
comparison of an individual’s own get versus give ratio versus that of a referent.  
When this investment-to-outcome ratio is approximately equal among parties, justice 
is perceived, and vice versa.  An inequity results in decreased satisfaction and often 
a search for alternatives.       
Similar to findings in organizational theory (Gilliland, 1993; Leventhal, 1980; 
Thibaut and Walker, 1975), channel members expect to be treated fairly, a 
dimension referred to as procedural justice.  “Procedural fairness is the glue that 
holds the relationship together” (Kumar, 1996, p.104).  It has been found to be more 
important than distributive justice (Gilliland, 1993).  Procedural justice increases 
knowledge sharing, continuous commitment, and relationship investment, which, in 
turn, increase buyer-supplier relationship performance (Liu et al., 2012).   
Procedures are seen as just when they include the following six principles:  
(1) bilateral communication, (2) impartiality (equal opportunity), (3) refutability, (4) 
explanation, (5) familiarity, and (6) respect (Kumar, 1996).  Other important aspects 
of procedural justice include: consistent decisions based on accurate information, 
consideration of the ethical values of affected individuals, and outcomes that could 
be modified (Leventhal,1980).  A nuance of procedural justice concerns the 
treatment of affected individuals while enacting a decision – a phenomenon termed 
interactional justice (Bies and Moag, 1986).  Not only is the content of a decision 
important, but so is the way in which it is communicated.  Affected people’s justice 
perceptions are affected by whether they receive an explanation for a decision (i.e., 
justification), and whether they are respected and not treated rudely (i.e., treated 
well).   
Inter-organizational justice has been defined as “boundary spanners’ 
perceptions of the fairness of each other’s actions in interorganizational 
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relationships” (Beugre and Acar, 2008, p. 452).  Inter-organizational justice during 
sourcing processes is important due to its effect on relationship continuity (Kaynak et 
al., 2015).  In procurement, justice or fairness has been examined in relation to 
many essential processes such as supplier selection (Plank et al., 1994), inspection 
and acceptance (Plank et al., 1994), dispute resolution (Lu et al., 2017), post-award 
negotiations of changes (Lu et al., 2017), forecast information sharing (Blancero and 
Ellram, 1997), and supplier performance evaluation (Blancero and Ellram, 1997; 
Hawkins and Gravier, 2016), to name a few. 
A common thread across inter-organizational justice theory and social 
exchange theory is communication.  Most of the aforementioned principles pertain in 
some way to communication.  The theory of channel communication might be 
instructive (Blancero and Ellram, 1997; Mohr and Sohi, 1995), but pertains to ex post 
versus ex ante relationship formation.  Very little research addresses the essential 
elements of communication during relationship formation, and particularly the 
interplay of these communication elements with perceptions of justice.  Therefore, 
the focus here entails supplier selection prior to relationship formation.   
Many of the meso-level factors predicting bid protests should focus on the 
seminal effects of buyer-supplier communication.  As such, this research addresses 
how the structural design of the acquisition process either hinders or facilitates the 
communication of expectations, explanations of decisions, respect, disagreement, 
and opportunity.  Pertinent factors can be organized as characteristics of the 
procurement, acquisition strategy components, and human factors.   
Characteristics of the procurement 
It has been suggested that when revenue is at stake, incumbents who are 
unsuccessful offerors on the follow-on contract source selection are likely to protest 
(Arena et al., 2018). We also know that protests increase as the contract value as a 
proportion of the offeror’s total revenue increases (Maser and Thompson, 2010).  
Similarly, requirement criticality represents the level of contribution an acquired good 
or service makes to the requiring activity’s mission (Kraljic, 1983).  When goods and 
services are critically important, the requiring activity is likely to have a persistent 
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need.  This means that not only is the revenue and profit of the current requirement 
at stake, but so is that of future, repeat procurements.  Offerors may protest so as to 
not lose out on the promise of persistent income.  Thus, it is expected that:  
H1: There will be a positive relationship between dollar value of the 
proposed contract and receipt of a bid protest.  
H2: There will be a positive relationship between criticality of the 
requirement and receipt of a bid protest.  
Maser and Thompson (2010) found that protests are more likely in cases of 
procured services versus goods.  The more difficult the definition of requirements 
(i.e., the communication of all expectations and performance levels), the more likely 
the buyer’s evaluation team will misunderstand the proposed value offering.  Hence, 
an overly strict evaluation criterion rating, a weakness, or a deficiency could be 
undeservingly assigned to the offeror’s proposal.  Similarly, the more intangible the 
service or its outcome, the more likely the buyer will omit a specification or 
inadequately define it for offerors.  Thus, offerors may not adequately address a true 
underlying, yet undescribed, need.  The mis-evaluation of poorly or under-specified 
needs may raise perceptions of procedural injustice.  Therefore, it is posited that: 
H3: The type of value procured will be associated with receipt of a bid 
protest.  
Protest risk has been found to be a significant predictor of fear of protest 
(Hawkins et al., 2016).  Protest risk represents the product of the probability of 
receiving a bid protest and the magnitude of the consequences of receiving a 
protest.  As previously discussed, negative consequences could include delayed 
receipt of needed goods and services, added effort of a source selection team 
increasing transaction costs, litigation costs such as bid and proposal costs, contract 
termination for convenience costs, potential shame and embarrassment to the 
acquisition team, and even adverse personnel action to those committing errors.  
Not all acquisitions are equally susceptible to protest.  For instance, a ten-
year, multi-billion dollar, unique service contract (e.g., cloud computing or 
cybersecurity) will have higher odds of being protested than a similar single-year 
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contract due to its dollar amount, duration, and its associated compounding 
reputational effects.  Neither are the consequences of a protest the same for each 
acquisition.  For example, redoing an evaluation of three proposals entails less 
transaction costs than that of 14.  Similarly redoing evaluations involving four 
evaluation criteria entails less transaction costs than that involving 20.  Further, 
delaying the award of a five billion dollar acquisition would likely cost the buyer more 
than that of a 200 thousand dollar acquisition.  In terms of justice theory, where the 
distribution of negative consequences is unbalanced between buyer and seller or 
between competing offerors, protest risk should increase.  Where the product of 
protest probability and magnitude of consequences is large, a protest is more likely.  
Thus, it is posited that: 
H4: There will be a positive relationship between protest risk and receipt 
of a bid protest.  
Acquisition strategy variables/decisions 
Government source selections take time.  But, agencies, in their acquisition 
processes, should not consume too much time thereby dissuading the best firms 
from participating in the government market (Edwards, 2006).  Sometimes, the 
allotted procurement lead time is limited in order to receive the goods and services 
when needed, and sometimes proper advance planning does not occur 
necessitating expedited sourcing.  It is logical that when the myriad of tasks 
associated with source selection are rushed, mistakes may occur.  Likewise, the 
insufficiency of planned procurement lead time has been found to increase the fear 
of protest (Hawkins et al., 2016). Ill-suited procurement lead time may signal to 
offerors that their proposals have not been thoroughly or fairly evaluated or that 
reasonable and legitimate tradeoff decisions have been made and documented; 
thus, perceptions of procedural justice may suffer.  It is thus posited that: 
H5: There will be a negative relationship between sufficiency of planned 
procurement lead time and receipt of a bid protest.  
Various methods are available to source selection teams to evaluate offers 
and choose between them.  The three best value methods mentioned in FAR Part 
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15 include a full trade-off (FT), a price-past performance trade-off (PPT) and the low-
price, technically-acceptable (LPTA) method.  The FT method allows for trade-offs 
between price and non-price factors.  Hence, using a FT method, a buyer is 
permitted to pay more for higher performance.  In contrast, under a LPTA method, 
non-price factors are evaluated as acceptable or unacceptable.  Once proposals are 
deemed acceptable on each non-price evaluation criterion, the award decision 
defaults to the low-price offer.  Therefore, a binary rating of acceptable or 
unacceptable under an LPTA method is, in general, easier to defend than is a 
ordered-categorical-scale rating (e.g., outstanding, good, acceptable, marginal, 
unacceptable).  Further, making and justifying tradeoffs between such categorical 
ratings and price poses challenges in order to withstand scrutiny.  For example, how 
outstanding does an offer need to be to warrant paying a five percent higher price? 
Qualitative evidence suggests that contracting officers believe that their 
choice of source selection method can affect the receipt of a bid protest, and that 
this impacted their decision (Arena et al., 2018; Gordon, 2013).  The LPTA method, 
due to its lower subjectivity, is more easily defendable and is less prone to errors 
than is the FT method.  Under a FT method, multiple criteria and multiple evaluators 
could invite dissonance in evaluations among team members of the meaning of 
criteria, and could invite the subliminal use of unstated evaluation criteria that, 
arguably, needed to have been in the solicitation.  Evaluations conducted contrary to 
the process prescribed in the solicitation can raise perceptions of procedural 
injustice by offerors.  In several cases, an LPTA source selection has been used or 
suggested explicitly as a means of avoiding a bid protest (Pocock, 2009; Schwartz 
and Manuel, 2015).  As such, it is posited that:  
H6: There will be a negative relationship between source selection 
method appropriateness and receipt of a bid protest.  
H7: The LPTA source selection method will be negatively associated 
with receipt of a bid protest.  
Bid protests have been associated with socio-economic status (Maser and 
Thompson, 2010).  Small businesses account for most protests at the GAO (53%) 
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and at the COFC (58%) (Arena et al., 2018).  Maser and Thompson (2010) posited 
that small businesses are more likely to protest than are large businesses, and 
further, that small businesses commonly protest other small businesses’ contract 
awards.  Given that protests are related to the procurement’s proportion of the 
offeror’s revenue (Maser and Thompson, 2010), this proportion will be higher for 
small businesses.  Thus, it is posited that:  
H8:  There will be a positive relationship between a small business set-
aside and receipt of a bid protest. 
The acquisition strategy encompasses the source selection method but is 
more broad.  It also entails such components as: the contract type, milestones, team 
members, team size, evaluation criteria, contract duration, incentives, options, 
number of contracts, contract line item structure, price and cost analysis method, 
contract clauses and solicitation provisions, and payments method - to name a few.  
The extent to which these components of strategy do not fit the procurement could 
invite errors in the evaluation of proposals.  As such, it is posited that:  
H9: There will be a negative relationship between acquisition strategy 
appropriateness and receipt of a bid protest.  
In source selection, often all technical evaluators are not involved in the 
determination of evaluation criteria or in the definition of their meaning.  
Furthermore, often, technical evaluators are not versed in the nuances of the rules of 
proposal evaluation and bid protests (Molenaar and Tran, 2015).  Criteria that should 
have been in the solicitation but were omitted, for whatever reason, can by mistake 
or otherwise, inappropriately creep into the evaluation.  A failure to follow the stated 
evaluation criteria is cited as a leading cause of sustained protests (GAO, 2014).  
Evaluation comments and proposal critiques that are useful in discriminating 
between offers can, therefore, be discouraged by review committees and legal 
counsel (Arena et al., 2018).  The extent to which technical evaluator’s evaluations 
are sanitized by reviewers should mitigate procedural injustices, and therefore, 
protests.  Thus,      
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H10: There will be a negative relationship between compromised 
technical evaluations and receipt of a bid protest.  
Often, source selection teams are rushed by aggressive milestones for 
contract award.  One way to reduce procurement lead time is to bypass discussions 
(i.e., negotiations or, more often, the resolution of weaknesses and deficiencies in 
proposals).  Conducting a source selection without discussions occurs more often 
than not (Payne and Hackenbracht, 2009).  In order to award a contract without 
discussions, the contracting officer must notify offerors in the solicitation of the intent 
to award without discussions, making it a deliberate acquisition strategy decision.  
Rushing the process and foregoing an opportunity to fully understand each aspect of 
each proposal might invite errors to the evaluations.  Additionally, one aspect of 
procedural justice is to afford individuals an opportunity to impact the decision 
process (e.g., proposal evaluations) or offer input (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). 
Foregoing discussions denies such input.  Thus, it is posited that:   
H11: There will be a positive relationship between intent to award 
without discussions and receipt of a bid protest.  
On the other hand, discussions entail strict procedural rules ripe for errors.  
For example, discussing one aspect of a proposal with one offeror and failing to 
check the same with each other offeror (e.g., past performance reference relevance 
in terms of type of work, location, or weather) could be a protestable offense 
(Wallace, 2018).  The unequal treatment of offerors was cited as a leading cause of 
sustained protests (GAO, 2014).  If discussions are opened, the procurement 
becomes substantially more error-prone due to the strict procedures and 
documentation required.  Inadequate documentation is cited as a leading cause of 
sustained bid protests (GAO, 2014; Wallace, 2018).  For this reason, discussions 
are sometimes avoided by Contracting Officers (Gordon, 2013).  As such,  
H12: There will be a positive relationship between conducting 
discussions and receipt of a bid protest.  
Oral presentations constitute the submission of proposal information orally 
(Edwards, 2006).  Oral presentations were codified in the FAR in concert with the 
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rewrite of Part 15 in 1997 as a tool to streamline the source selection process and to 
improve pre-award communications between offerors and the government 
(Hannaway, 2000).  Oral presentations facilitate communication from the offeror of 
its understanding of the work, its capabilities (Edwards, 2006), its past performance, 
and its technical approach (Rumbaugh, 2010).  This explanation should enhance 
evaluators’ understanding of the proposals resulting in more accurate evaluations 
and ratings (e.g., proposal risk).  Indeed, explanation and bilateral communication 
are among the six principles of the theory of justice (Kumar, 1996).  
On the other hand, oral presentations add one more step to a complicated 
evaluation process (i.e., more opportunity to make a mistake).  Specifically, 
entertaining oral presentations without opening discussions means that source 
selection team members, in their communications, must be careful not to allow an 
offeror to revise its proposal – even orally (Cibinic et al., 2011; Edwards, 2006).  Of 
course, this requires a perfect knowledge of each element of an offeror’s written 
proposal in order to recognize whether any statement made during an oral 
presentation constitutes a change to any prior written or oral proposal submission.  
Obviously, prospective contracts with expansive or complicated scopes of work can 
render such perfect knowledge untenable.  Proposal revisions may inadvertently be 
made.  Consider also that salespeople naturally want to satisfy evaluators (i.e., avoid 
negative ratings or perceptions of weaknesses); thus, changes to proposals can be 
difficult to avoid as salespeople can sense evaluators’ concerns by either non-verbal 
cues or by the ensuing line of questioning.  Given the aforementioned conflicting 
arguments to the benefit or harm of an oral presentation, no directional claim is 
made.   
H13: There will be a relationship between the use of oral presentations 
and receipt of a bid protest.  
The GAO repeatedly cites inadequate documentation of the record as a chief 
culprit of sustained bid protests (GAO, 2014).  Poor documentation could include 
contradictions in the records and omissions of details needed to justify ratings and 
tradeoff decisions.  Documents relied upon during proposal evaluations include the:  
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source selection decision document, comparative analysis of proposals, evaluation 
notices to offerors, source selection plan, debriefing scripts, technical evaluations, 
past performance evaluations, cost or price analyses, rating charts, and evaluation 
briefing charts.  Additionally, protest probability has been qualitatively associated 
with source selection document scrutiny (Arena et al., 2018).  The purpose of the 
scrutiny is to avoid a protest.  Thus, logic holds that more revisions reduce errors 
and thereby lower the chances of receiving a bid protest.  Added scrutiny entails 
often multiple acquisition team members pouring over all of the documents to 
prevent errors such as those cited by the GAO – unequal treatment of offerors and 
following the evaluation process and criteria per the RFP.  As such, it is posited that: 
H14: There will be a negative relationship between the number of source 
selection document revisions and receipt of a bid protest.  
In order to appease otherwise unsuccessful offerors and thwart a protest, 
contracting officers will sometimes award more contracts than planned (Payne and 
Hackenbracht, 2009).  In essence, the work gets split among two or more 
contractors so that there are no losers.  For example, building, fielding, and 
sustaining two varieties of Littoral Combat Ship platforms substantially increased 
costs relative to doing so for a single platform (O’Rourke, 2014), but mitigated the 
threat of a protest. Thus,    
H15: There will be a negative relationship between increased actual 
number of contracts awarded versus that intended and receipt of a bid 
protest.  
Qualitative evidence suggests that contracting officers adjust the chosen type 
of contract to the probability of a protest (Arena et al., 2018). More complicated 
contract types (e.g., cost reimbursement) entail more complicated cost analyses that 
are prone to controversy and error (e.g., should-cost analysis).  Prior research found 
that cost plus-type contracts are more likely to be protested (Maser and Thompson, 
2010). Thus, it is posited that: 
H16:  Contract type will be associated with receipt of a bid protest. 
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Acquisition officials exercise judgment in assigning an appropriate amount of 
resources to conduct a source selection.  They must consider evaluators’ 
availabilities, expertise, and location.  Potential resources are balanced with the task 
demands such as the award milestones, required travel, quantity of expected 
proposals, and quantity of evaluation factors and sub-factors (Edwards, 2006).  For 
source selections with higher protest risk, acquisition officials may assign more 
evaluators and other team members and for a larger portion of their time.  Logically, 
more people and more effort should mitigate protest-worthy mistakes.  More 
resources can be indicated by transaction costs, determined by the number of full-
time equivalent personnel working on the source selection.  Therefore, 
H17: There will be a negative relationship between transaction costs 
and receipt of a bid protest. 
Human factors 
Fear of protest describes the level of apprehension a contracting professional 
has about receiving a bid protest (Hawkins et al., 2016).  It follows that in cases in 
which contracting officers are worried about a protest, the acquisition team will take 
added measures to prevent a protest.  Thus, it is posited that:   
H18: There will be a negative relationship between fear of protest and 
receipt of a bid protest.  
The RAND Corporation’s study of bid protests revealed that industry 
representatives question the competency of the acquisition workforce, citing a need 
for additional training (Arena et al., 2018).  Additionally, source selection experience 
has been found to reduce fear of protest (Hawkins et al., 2016).  Experience appears 
to yield confidence in the compliance of the procurement process.  Training and 
education may also provide the necessary awareness of the myriad of laws, 
regulations, and case law – any of the peculiarities of which could jeopardize a 
procurement.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that:   
H19: There will be a negative relationship between experience and 
receipt of a bid protest.  
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Combined, this set of hypotheses should help predict bid protests.  The 
conceptual mode (Figure 1) is sufficiently comprehensive to enable practitioners to 
determine needed definitive action to improve the effectiveness of their source 
selections.   
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
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Methodology 
The purpose of this research was to identify factors associated with the 
receipt of bid protests. This study examined a unique, rich data set of 350 
government source selections resulting from a survey of U.S. Navy contracting 
officials.  The data went beyond that of typical protest research that relies on 
summary-level contract award data from FPDS-NG and GAO’s Electronic Protest 
Docketing System.  Rather, the data set includes unique insights from those 
involved in the source selection, including perceptions (e.g., source selection 
method appropriateness) and objective data elements not captured elsewhere (e.g., 
intent to award without discussions).  Given the exploratory nature of the research, a 
backward stepwise logistic regression model was applied to the data.  The 
remainder of this section details the unit of analysis, data, measurement of 
constructs, the data demographics, reliability, and validity.   
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this research was a U.S. federal government source 
selection.  Since many bid protests stem from a protestable action associated with a 
source selection (e.g., a proposal rating, rating justification, or basis of a tradeoff 
analysis), this is the proper unit of analysis for the study.  The data pertained to 
source selections conducted pursuant to FAR Part 15; those conducted using 
simplified acquisition procedures and task order competitions were excluded.   
Data  
The data set included 350 records of source selections.  Many records were 
omitted from this analysis due to missing data and conflicting data.  Five records 
reported zero PALT, which is not possible.  Another 32 records reported PALT less 
than 45 days.  While the original survey instructed respondents to complete the 
survey pertaining to a FAR Part 15 source selection under $150 thousand, some 
respondents may have reported on task order competitions.  Due to advertising 
requirements (15 days), proposal preparation time (30 days), and time for 
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evaluations, FAR Part 15 source selections should consume at least 45 days from 
receipt of a complete requirements package.  Also, 15 records either included no 
dollar value or a value that was less than the simplified acquisition threshold 
($150,000 – meaning FAR Part 13 procedures or task order procedures were more 
likely).  Finally, 66 records did not include sufficient transaction cost data to 
determine full-time equivalents.  Together, for the sake of complete data and 
consistency of source selection rules, these 110 records were removed leaving a 
data set of 240 records for analysis.   
Measurement 
The model included objective variables and latent constructs.  Compromised 
technical evaluations was measured using a three-item scale.  It assessed the 
extent that technical evaluators perceived that constraints imposed on their 
evaluations impeded an ability to write a meaningful evaluation (e.g., via a need to 
change an evaluation criteria or its definition).  Protest fear was measured using a 
four-item scale.  It assessed the degree of apprehension a contracting professional 
had about receiving a bid protest. Sufficient PALT was measured using a three-item 
scale. It measured the respondent’s perception of (in)adequate time allocated to the 
source selection.  Criticality was measured with a three-item scale.  It assessed the 
level of importance of the product or service being purchased to the success of the 
buying organization’s mission.  Acquisition strategy appropriateness was measured 
using a six-item scale.  It assessed the perceived degree to which the respondent 
believed the acquisition strategy fit the buying situation and would facilitate the 
buying organization selecting the optimal supplier and meeting its objectives.  As 
defined, acquisition strategy encompasses complexity, dollar value, acquisition 
objectives, contract length, performance risk, criticality to the mission, availability of 
supply, and source selection milestones.  Source selection method appropriateness 
was measured with a single-item scale, and assessed the degree to which the 
respondent believed the applied source selection method (i.e., LPTA, PPT, or full 
trade-off) was the best fit to the buying situation considering aspects such as 
complexity, dollar value, acquisition objectives, contract length, performance risk, 
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criticality to the mission, availability of supply, and time available to award a contract.  
The scales for latent constructs can be found in Appendix A. 
The following variables were categorical (binary), coded as a 1 if the condition 
existed and 0 otherwise:  intent to award without discussions, LPTA, discussions, 
oral presentations, increased contracts, small business set-aside, sustained protest 
experience, construction, service, and cost reimbursement contract.  Dollar value 
represented the awarded contract amount inclusive of all options.  Document 
revisions was a count of how many revisions source selection documents underwent 
such as the source selection decision document, comparative analysis, evaluation 
notices, source selection plan, cost or price analysis, briefing charts, and debriefing 
scripts.  Protest experience represented a sum of protests experienced by the 
respondent over his or her career.  Contracting experience measured the number of 
years the respondent served in a contracting role.  Source selection experience was 
measured by the quantity of source selections the respondent had experienced 
throughout his or her career.  Protest risk was calculated as the sum of the products 
of the probability of occurrence of five protest-related outcomes and each of their 
magnitudes of effect.  Transaction costs was measured by counting the number of 
personnel participating in the source selection considering how much of each 
member’s time was allocated to the source selection.   
Tests for skewness and kurtosis revealed that four variable z-scores for 
skewness were greater than an absolute value of three, suggesting that the data for 
four variables – dollar value, document revisions, protest experience, and source 
selection experience - were skewed (Kline, 1997).  Similarly four variables showed 
an absolute value of kurtosis z-scores greater than ten (Kline, 1997).  These 
statistics suggest that the variables are not normally distributed.  While logistic 
regression does not rely on an assumption of normally distributed indicators, two of 
the variables – dollar value and document revisions - were Log10 transformed in 
order to mitigate distortion due to extreme values.  Their skewness and kurtosis 
statistics were 9.9 and 105.3 and 8.9 and 87.8, respectively.  Transformation should 
improve model fit.  Additionally, it is customary to transform contract dollar values in 
business research.       
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Data Demographics 
The average dollar value of the resultant contracts was $128.3 million (std. 
dev. $668.7M; median: $16.3M; range: $163.3K-$8B).  Demographics characterizing 
the respondents and the source selections for which they responded are found in the 
ensuing tables.  The sample was respectably experienced, an average 14.2 years in 
contracting.  Respondents experienced an average 2.2 protests in their careers (std 
dev 3.5, range 0-25); 38 experienced a sustained protest.  Respondents’ average 
number of source selections experienced was 40.  They were also educated, with 
58% holding a Master’s degree or higher.  Most respondents were female (55%).   
The sample is heavily influenced by services versus construction and 
products.  Knowledge-based services dominate the service category (49%) and 
represented 28% of all records.  Small business set asides comprised 43% of the 
records.  The data represented a variety of products and services, 126 different 
PSC/FSC codes.  All major contract types are represented; however, most are firm-
fixed price.  Of the 240 source selections, 43 were protested.  Tables 1-5 further 
describe the sample and provide insight to the extent of generalizability of the 
results.   
Table 1. Contracting Experience 
Years Frequency 
0 - 9 110 
10 - 19 52 
20 - 29 53 
30 - 39 24 
40 + 1 
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Table 2. Education 
Highest Degree Frequency 






Table 3. Purchase Type 
Type Frequency % Protested 
Services 138 24 
Construction 40 13 
Supplies/Commodities/Spares 39 8 
Weapon System 17 6 
Capital Equipment 6 17 
 
Table 4. Contract Type 
Type Frequency % Protested 
Firm-Fixed Price 134 13 
Cost Reimbursement 74 27 
Time & Materials 3 0 
Labor-Hour 2 0 
Hybrid 23 22 
Other 4 25 
 
Table 5. Source Selection Method 
Type Frequency % Protested 
LPTA 72 13 
Price-Performance Trade-off 24 17 
Full Trade-off 144 21 
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Measure Evaluation 
Reliability and Validity  
The reliability of the five latent constructs measured by multi-item scales was 
assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha, a measure of internal consistency reliability.  The 
reliability of each construct (Table 7) was compared to the generally-accepted 
standard of 0.7 for established scales a. 0.6 for new scales (Nunnally, 1978).  Each 
construct exceeded the 0.7 threshold.   
Reliability is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for validity (Kerlinger and 
Lee, 2000).  Another aspect of validity that must be satisfied is to ensure that what is 
actually measured corresponds with what was intended to be measured.  This 
aspect of validity addresses the accuracy of the measures.  Construct validity was 
assessed using principle components exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with a 
Varimax rotation.  All five predictor constructs measured via multiple-item scales 
were run together in an exploratory factor analysis.  Individual items were assessed 
for sufficient correlation with the factor (factor loading), greater than 0.6, while 
simultaneously ensuring cross-loadings were less than 0.3 (Table 6).  Items were 
iteratively trimmed until these thresholds were met.  Overall, the constructs were 
deemed to be of sufficient reliability and construct validity.  Table 7 presents the 
means, standard deviations, scale reliabilities, and correlations for these constructs.  
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Table 6. Factor Loadings* 
 
Compromised 
Tech. Eval. Protest Fear Sufficient PALT Criticality 
Acq. Strategy 
Appropriateness 
CTE2 .878     
CTE3 .894     
CTE6 .589     
FEAR1  .880    
FEAR2  .907    
FEAR3  .844    
FEAR5  .808    
PALT1   .825   
PALT2   .790   
PALT3   .875   
CRIT2    .883  
CRIT3    .911  
CRIT4    .784  
ACQSTAPP1     .890 
ACQSTAPP2     .867 
ACQSTAPP3     .732 
ACQSTAPP4     .719 
ACQSTAPP5     .799 
ACQSTAPP6     .857 
*Crosss-loadings < .30 not shown
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Table 7. Construct Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilitiesa and Correlations 
Construct Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1. Sufficient 
PALT 
3.43 .88 .81             




840.10 .08 -            
3. Compromised 
Tech. Eval. 
3.43 .91 -.24** .06 .75           
4. Document 
Revisions 
42.24 108.75 -.02 .13 .11 -          
5. Protest 
Experience 
2.23 3.50 -.02 -.03 .03 .07 -         
6. Contracting 
Experience 




40.19 83.97 -.09 -.05 .01 .02 .38** .30** -       
8. Protest Fear 4.26 .97 -.13* .15* .23** .13 .04 -.03 -.17** .89      
9. Acq. Strategy 
Appropriateness 
5.60 .60 .30** .02 -.30** -.02 -.07 -.08 -.04 -.11 .90     
10. Criticality 5.96 .39 -.04 .08 -.02 .08 .06 -.13* -.05 .07 .14* .83    





6.03 1.42 .24** .06 -.29** -.02 -.03 -.01 .00 .00 .59** .08 -.03 -  
13. Transaction 
Costs (FTE)c 
3.60 6.47 .04 .75** .09 .17** -.04 -.01 -.10 .06 -.03 .10 .01 .01 - 
**Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  aReliabilities are presented on the diagonal for multi-item scales,   
bSingle-item scale. cNon-transformed 
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Results 
The model was tested using backward stepwise logistic regression, a 
common statistical technique applied to bid protest research (Maser and Thompson, 
2010).  Logistic regression is the multivariate procedure of choice in which the 
dependent variable is categorical and involves only two groups (Hair et al., 2010), in 
this case a source selection that was either protested or not.  Results are shown in 
Table 8. 
Generally, the model demonstrated satisfactory fit to the data.  First, the 
omnibus chi-square test, a measure that resembles the F test in regular regression 
(Hair et al. 2006), indicated an improvement in the -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) value  
from the base model to the final model ( χ 2 = 52.617, p < .001).  Nevertheless, the 
model in the final step (step 16) did not differ from that of the prior step ( χ 2 = -2.614, 
p = .106).  The Hosmer and Lemeshow Test was not significant ( χ 2 = 6.57, p < .58) 
indicating no difference between the observed and predicted classifications.  
Practical significance of the model was evidenced by two assessments of pseudo 
R2.  The Cox and Snell R2 was .197, and the Nagelkerke R2 was .323 indicating that 
between 20% and 32% of the variance in the likelihood of receiving a protest was 
explained by the significant predictor variables.  However, another assessment of 
practical significance, the hit ratio (portion of cases classified correctly), was less 
promising.  While the model classified non-protested source selections with 96% 
accuracy, it only predicted 30% of protests given the set of predictor variables.  
Together, these findings suggest that other variables not available in the data set 
should be sought in fully explaining protest likelihood.  
Of the eight predictor variables retained in the final model, six showed beta 
coefficients significantly different from zero at the .05 level of significance.  The other 
two predictors were marginally significant (p < .10).  As seen in Table 8, service, 
protest fear, transaction costs, dollar value, document revisions, and sustained 
protest experience were found to be significant, and oral presentation and criticality 
were marginally significant.  Therefore, protests can be linked to these eight factors.  
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These findings support H1, H2, H3, H13, H17, and H18.  Experience and document 
revisions were expected to yield negative relationships with the odds of a protest, 
but they related positively; thus, no support is found for H14 and H19.  The final 
model can be stated as: 
 
Yi = β0 + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 - β3Xi3 + β4Xi4 + β5Xi5 + β6Xi6 - β7Xi7 + β8Xi8 + εi 
 
Model Definitions: 
• Y = Bid protest  
• X1 = Criticality 
• X2 = Service 
• X3 = Oral presentations 
• X4 = Dollar value 
• X5 = Protest fear 
• X6 = Sustained protest experience 
• X7 = Transaction cost 
• X8 = Document revisions 
 
Criticality of the requirement was also linked to the odds of receiving a 
protest.  Each increment of criticality (measured on a 1-7 Likert type scale) 
increased the likelihood of a protest by nearly 18 percent.  Buying services had a 
strong effect.  When buying services, the odds of receiving a protest increased 2.9 
times.  The use of oral presentations decreases the odds of receiving a protest by 76 
percent.  Consistent with previous research, dollar value was positively related to 
receiving a bid protest.  For each ten-fold increase in contract dollar value, the odds 
of receiving a protest increase 2.5 times. Protest fear was also positively related to 
the likelihood of receiving a protest.  For every one-point increase in protest fear 
(measured on a 1-7 Likert type scale), the odds of a protest increased by nine 
percent.  If the contracting officer had previously experienced a sustained protest, 
the odds of receiving a protest increased by 3.7 times. Transaction cost was 
negatively related to a bid protest.  For each additional FTE assigned to the source 
selection, the odds of receiving a protest decrease 15 percent.  Finally, document 
revisions increased the odds of receiving a protest. For each ten-fold increase in 
document revisions, the odds of receiving a protest increase 3.4 times.    
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No effect was found for the remaining variables:  intent to award without 
discussions, sufficient PALT, construction, compromised technical evaluations, 
conducting discussions, increased quantity of contracts awarded, contract type, 
contracting experience, source selection experience, small business set-aside, 
acquisition strategy appropriateness, protest risk, and source selection method 
appropriateness.   
This exploratory model does not appear to be limited by sample size.  There 
are at least five occurrences (Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007) of the less frequent 
level of the dependent variable per predictor variable.  Since there were 43 protests 
(i.e., the less frequent level of the DV), the model could yield stable estimates if 
containing eight or fewer predictor variables.  Thus, with seven predictors in the 
model, the threat of overfitting the model was mitigated.     
 
Table 8. Logistic Regression Predictors of Bid Protests 
Independent Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Criticality .16 .08 3.72 .054 1.18 
Service 1.07 .44 5.94 .015 2.92 
Oral presentations -1.44 .86 2.78 .095 .24 
Dollar value* .92 .30 9.32 .002 2.51 
Protest fear .09 .04 5.78 .016 1.09 
Sustained protest experience 1.31 .51 6.62 .01 3.71 
Transaction costs -.16 .08 4.37 .037 .85 
Document revisions* 1.23 .62 3.94 .047 3.41 
*Transformed 
 
There were several other important insights into source selections available 
from the data.  First, most source selection teams (79%) intend to award contracts 
without conducting discussions – or, at least, desire the flexibility to do so.  This is 
perplexing in light of the value of fully understanding an offeror’s proposal and the 
risk of failing to do so.  While only 21% of source selections included planned 
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discussions, they were conducted in 60% of source selections.  Oddly, 38 percent of 
respondents (92) indicated that awarding a contract without conducting discussions 
would be inappropriate to some degree.  Together, these responses suggests 
internal dissonance among contracting officers; they are employing source selection 
strategies with which they do not entirely agree.  Respondents were asked to rate 
their level of satisfaction with the freedom to openly discuss those aspects of the 
proposals that needed to be discussed with the offeror in order to fully understand 
the offer and to properly evaluate the proposals.  A noticeable proportion (18%) of 
contracting personnel were not satisfied with the discussions held.   
Oral presentations of offers are rare events (8.3%).  Protested FAR Part 15 
source selections are over-represented in the data (18%).  Nonetheless, when the 
data was collected, self-selection bias was mitigated by asking respondents to 
complete the survey with respect to the latest completed FAR Part 15 source 
selection (regardless of whether it was protested).   The overall protest rate, 
excluding task/delivery orders has been estimated at 7% (Camm et al., 2012).  
Sometimes (7%), contracting officers – who are responsible for selecting the 
appropriate source selection method – believed that an inappropriate method was 
employed.  One method of interest due to its alleged overuse in order to avoid 
protests is LPTA, which was inappropriately used 17% of the time it was employed.  
Additionally, another alleged protest avoidance mechanism, awarding more 
contracts than intended, is a rather rare event (5%).  Nonetheless, respondents 
clearly reported actions are frequently taken to deliberately avoid protests (Table 
11).  Fifty three respondents reported avoiding a FAR Part 15 source selection by 
awarding a task/delivery order an average of over 43 times each throughout their 
careers.  Forty four respondents reported avoiding a FAR Part 15 source selection 
by negotiating a sole source contract an average of 14 times each.  Forty eight 
respondents reported avoiding a FAR Part 15 source selection by modifying an 
existing contract an average of over 15 times each.  In sum, 3,669 requirements 
were sourced using these deliberately subversive tactics without affording eligible 
sources an opportunity to compete.   
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Source selections are not without significant transaction costs, averaging 243 
thousand dollars.  Currently, the contracting process is labor intensive.  Alarmingly, 
there were three cases in the data in which the buying organization incurred 
transaction costs exceeding the dollar value of the contract.    
Table 9. Acquisition Strategy Characteristics 
Type Count % 
Intended to award without discussions 190 79 
Inappropriate to award without discussions 92 38 
Held discussions 143 60 
Dissatisfied with discussions 43 18 
Oral presentations used 20 8.3 
Oral presentations appropriate 57 24 
Oral presentations appropriate and not used 50 88 
Small business set-aside 102 43 
Protests 43 18 
Inappropriate source selection method used 17 7 
LPTA used but inappropriate 12 17 
Awarded more contracts than intended 12 5 
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Table 10. Transaction Costs 
 Average Std Dev Min Max 
Team Members 10.3 4.3 3 21 
Transaction Costs $243,390 $300,415 $700 $3,551,944 
Transaction Costs/Contract 
Dollar $.066 $.203 $.00005 $1.77 
     
Document Revisions:     




3.20 6.67 0 99 
Evaluation Notices 13.94 98.63 0 1200 
Source Selection Plan 3.10 2.778 0 30 
Debriefing Scripts 2.43 3.56 0 27 
Technical Evaluations 5.55 9.07 0 99 
Past Performance 
Evaluations 4.22 8.65 0 99 
Cost/price Analysis 3.06 4.77 0 60 
Rating Charts 1.45 2.08 0 21 
Evaluation Briefing Charts 1.87 1.81 0 10 
TOTAL 42.2    
 
Table 11. Deliberate Source Selection Avoidance Mechanism Usage 
Type 
Average 
Times per User 
Total Times 
Used – All 
Respondents 
Min Max 
Task/delivery order 43.5 2,308 0 300 
Sole source 14.2 624 0 100 
Modify existing contract 15.4 737 0 114 
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Discussion 
Government contract formation is complicated by laws and regulations designed 
to instill public trust in the fair utilization of public funds.  Compliance with the myriad 
laws and regulations consumes time and human resources and requires experience.  
Indeed, a seminal book by Cibinic et al. (2011), dedicates135 pages solely to the 
nuances of bid protest laws, regulations, decisions, actors, processes, documentation, 
and timelines.   
The purpose of the research was to better understand why bid protests are 
lodged by interested parties.  In doing so, various meso-level decisions and actions that 
affect the receipt of a bid protest by acquisition teams were explored.  The intent was to 
diagnose alleged weaknesses and to explore potential improvements.  The following 
research questions were addressed:   
• RQ1:  What characteristics of a procurement affect whether a bid protest is 
received? 
• RQ2:  What acquisition strategy decisions affect whether a bid protest is 
received? 
• RQ3:  What human factors contribute to receipt of a bid protest? 
• RQ4:  Are the pertinent theories surrounding inter-organizational exchange 
complete, and if not, what extensions should be considered? 
Procurement Characteristics 
Addressing the first research question, several characteristics of the procurement 
are associated with receipt of a bid protest.  First, consistent with prior research, the 
dollar value of the contract opportunity – an indication of its value, scope and magnitude 
of required effort – is associated with bid protests (Maser and Thompson, 2010).  This is 
not surprising given the revenue implications to the unsuccessful offeror(s).  Larger 
scope also implies greater complexity, longer proposals, more in-depth evaluations, and 
greater opportunity for mistakes during source selection.   
The criticality of the requirement matters – the more important the procured 
product or service is to the mission of the requiring activity, the greater the likelihood of 
a protest.  Importance in a government context extended beyond mere dollar value of 
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the contract.  Rather, importance conveys an extent that the requiring activity is 
dependent on the product or service in order to be successful (i.e., its underlying need).  
Hence, suppliers sense the requiring activity’s need and recognize that needed 
products and services are likely to persist beyond the current source selection.  
Prospective suppliers don’t want to miss out on being the supplier for critical products 
and services for the sake of future revenue and profit.  This finding adds additional 
insight beyond mere dollars as a proxy for value.   
Another significant characteristic that lends itself to protests is the type of value 
procured.  Services seem to invite more protests than do other types such as weapon 
systems, products, and other capital equipment.  Services have been associated with 
protests in prior research, with explanations focusing on the inherent difficulty in defining 
all of the precise expectations of work elements and performance levels.  Key 
underlying characteristics of services are likely culprits – their intangibility (i.e., hard to 
specify and inability to inventory to buffer against uncertain demand), heterogeneity 
(i.e., hard to control uniformity), and sometimes simultaneous production and 
consumption (i.e., inability to fix defects ex ante) (Hawkins et al., 2014).  This means 
that evaluators could be evaluating unspecified but expected requirements – unstated 
requirements that only come to light in hindsight perhaps illuminated in one offeror’s 
proposal or by an evaluator’s unique experience or knowledge.  It seems that omissions 
would be a simple fix, but to do so means opening discussions, amending the 
solicitation, inviting revised proposals, and ultimately delaying the award.  Evaluators 
may be reluctant to admit a mistake in defining evaluation criteria with this magnitude of 
an impact.   
Acquisition Strategy Decisions 
Perhaps the most novel and interesting finding is the suppressing effect of oral 
presentations on bid protests.  Ironically, looking back at its formal adoption in the FAR 
Part 15 rewrite, opponents to oral presentations worried that in the absence of a written 
proposal, there would be no written record on which to base a protest and that oral 
presentations invited unfairness and arbitrariness in government source selections 
(Hannaway, 2000).  It seems that the opposite is true.  Oral presentations allow the 
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offeror to convey its capabilities and understanding of the contractual requirements 
(Hannaway, 2000).  Once the offeror meets the evaluators in person and sees that the 
evaluators understand its offer, it may be more likely to trust that the evaluators are 
indeed fairly evaluating the offer.  Nevertheless, using oral presentations properly 
without inviting a protest can be tricky, and this might explain why their use is not more 
ubiquitous.  Indeed, only 20 of the 244 source selections employed oral presentations.  
The issue hinges on whether an offeror, by what it says outright or says in response to a 
question, changes its proposal (either written or oral).  Once a proposal revision is 
accepted, discussions are effectively opened.  And once discussions are opened with 
one offeror, in the interest of fairness, they must be held with all offerors – and held 
consistently across each discussed matter.  Furthermore, discussions must be 
comprehensive and balanced across offerors; they must include all deficiencies and 
weaknesses.  Interestingly, in the data, of the 20 uses of oral presentations, 10 were 
conducted without discussions meaning only very limited clarifications and 
communications were allowed.  The utility of oral presentations may be questioned by 
source selection teams due to its restriction on communication and its invitation of 
protest risk if proposal revisions were inadvertently allowed.  Nevertheless, since oral 
presentations curtail bid protests, acquisition teams should: (1) strongly consider its use 
during formal source selections, and (2) commission further research to diagnose why 
its current use is so low and how they can be conducted to reap the greatest benefit 
(e.g., no protest, better buyer-supplier relationships, better understanding of 
requirements, and improve supplier performance).   
Transaction costs significantly decreased the probability of receiving a bid 
protest.  This variable was measured as the number of FTEs.  Thus, as the amount of 
human resources’ efforts applied to a source selection increased, protest odds 
decreased.  This finding suggests that for requirements in which time is of the essence, 
allocating additional personnel to the source selection in order to prevent a protest may 
be warranted.  However, what is not addressed is the relative transaction cost of those 
personnel and whether the additional personnel costs are worth the savings from 
avoiding a protest (i.e., awarding a contract sooner).   
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While the quantity of document revisions was expected to reduce the odds of 
receiving a protest, they actually increase the odds.  Source selection documents 
included the source selection decision document, comparative assessment/proposal 
analysis report, evaluation notices, source selection plan, debriefing script, technical 
evaluations, past performance evaluations, cost/price analysis, color rating chart, and 
evaluation briefing charts.  It is common that these documents will be tediously and 
repeatedly scrutinized by many personnel serving in different roles on the source 
selection team such as the contracting officer, evaluators, committee reviewers, and 
legal counsel.  Indeed, a post hoc test showed a positive correlation between protest 
fear and document revisions (r = .28; p < .01).           
Human Factors 
The contracting officer’s perceived fear of protest is positively related to protests. 
When the contracting officer is anxious and concerned about the possibility of a protest, 
it typically materializes.  This attests to the contracting officer’s ability to observe the 
evaluation process, the market, and the requirement, and then accurately predict an 
offeror’s challenge.  This finding is not surprising; procurement has long been labeled 
the boundary-spanning function in the firm most in tune with integrating suppliers into 
the buyer’s mission (Hallenbeck et al., 1999).  Within a government source selection, 
often the contracting officer serves as the source selection de facto program manager 
who manages milestones and integrates team members from disparate organizations 
such as financial management, engineering, logistics, legal, and the end user.  In other 
words, the contracting officer observes all of the evaluation process and knows all of the 
players, including prospective offerors.  His or her perspective and advice pertaining to 
the source selection should be sought and heeded by acquisition leaders since he or 
she appears to be adept at predicting a bid protest. 
Past protest experience of the contracting officer also appears to matter, albeit in 
an unexpected way.  It was expected that protest and source selection experience 
bolsters competence and ability, thereby reducing errors and future bid protests.  
Conversely, this research unveiled a positive relationship between protest experience –
having ever experienced a sustained protest – and the likelihood of receiving a protest. 
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Hence, more past exposure to lost protests links to more future protests.  This effect 
could be attributed to excessive workload.  It could also be attributed to the complicated 
nature of government source selection; there are nearly countless mistakes and events 
that can trigger a bid protest. Those personnel who have experienced a protest may be 
more likely to be assigned to the more complicated source selections in the future that 
are more susceptible to protests.  It should be noted that neither the quantity of protests 
previously experienced, number of source selections experienced, nor the years of 
contracting experience had an effect on the odds of receiving a protest.  Thus, simple 
indicators of competence appear to be inadequate in explaining bid protests.  It could 
also mean that the experience of only one source selection team member cannot 
predict a phenomenon (i.e., a protest) that depends on the experience of an entire team 
of personnel.      
Managerial Implications 
This research confirms the effect of contract dollar value on the odds of receiving 
a bid protest.  Higher-dollar acquisitions attract protests; thus, dollar value can serve as 
a reliable predictor of protests.  Thus, for very large-dollar procurements, acquisition 
leaders can factor in protest adjudication time to the PALT.  They can also take 
measures to thwart the protest such as assigning more resources to the source 
selection team.   
Since source selections for services lend themselves to protests, more caution 
should be exercised in their design and execution.  More experienced technical 
personnel could be allocated.  Note that this research measured only contracting officer 
experience.  Additionally, acquisition leaders should reconsider the part-time, ad hoc 
approach to staffing source selection efforts.  In organizations with high-volume 
contracting, two strategies may help:  (1) strategic sourcing, and (2) mobile source 
selection centers of excellence.  First, strategic sourcing could help by centralizing 
requirements to organizations that employ greater numbers of more experienced 
contracting, legal, and technical personnel.  Second, mobile centers of excellence can 
help by deploying expert teams to coach source selections locally.  Alternatively, a 
secure, collaborative software could be used to facilitate collaboration on documents 
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and face-to-face communication between a distant center of excellence and a local 
source selection team.   
Since the criticality of the requirement is associated with bid protests, acquisition 
leaders should gauge the criticality of each requirement to the requiring activity’s 
mission.  A standardized scale such as the one used in this research should be used to 
ensure reliable and valid measurement.  Criticality levels could then serve as an 
indicator of protest risk.  With greater risk, leaders can assign more resources such as 
PALT and experienced personnel.  Acquisition leaders could also consider shorter 
contract durations to avoid a long-term lock out of an unsuccessful offeror.  
Alternatively, for longer contracts, acquisition leaders could consider designing periodic 
on-ramps to provide another opportunity to unsuccessful offerors.  For planning, leaders 
can also expect a protest for those requirements with high criticality and factor in that 
added time until satisfying an internal customer’s acquisition need.    
Oral presentations appear to be underutilized in FAR Part 15 source selections 
(8.3% of the source selections).  While oral presentations were reported to be 
appropriate for the situation (i.e., considering the risk, criticality, dollar value, 
contribution to the mission, and complexity) in 57 (24%) of the source selections, they 
were only used in seven of those (approximately 12%).  This is puzzling and begs 
further probing.  Since oral presentations decrease the likelihood of receiving a protest, 
source selection teams should explore ways to broaden their use.  Additionally, policy 
makers should study the mechanisms underlying oral presentations to discern what 
aspects improve source selection decisions and what aspects decrease protests. If a 
key success attribute of oral presentations is the two-way dialogue between evaluators 
and offerors, it may be time to revisit the prudence of conducting oral presentations 
without discussions.  Opening discussions will allow unhindered, in-depth, two-way 
communications between evaluators and offerors to ensure a full understanding of the 
offeror’s capabilities, technical approach, and past performance.  The dialogue can also 
convey to the offerors the government’s commitment to impartiality and fairness, 
thereby build trust.   
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Acquisition managers should listen to the contracting officer’s intuition.  
Contracting officers’ assessments of concern over receiving a protest appear to be 
consistently reliable means of predicting a protest.  In cases in which protest fear is 
high, more resources should be applied and acquisition teams should consider 
strategies identified herein as antecedents to bid protests (e.g., conducting oral 
presentations).   
Surprisingly, source selection teams do not appear to be learning organizations.  
This could be due to their ad hoc, temporary basis.  Exposure to additional source 
selections had no effect on protests, nor did additional years of contracting experience 
in general.  Likewise. exposure to additional protests had no effect on the odds of 
receiving a protest.  Nevertheless, experiencing a sustained protest at some point in a 
career is associated with odds of receiving a bid protest, albeit in an unexpected way.  
Prior experience of a sustained protest by a Contracting Officer appears to indicate 
greater odds of a future protest.  Perhaps these professionals should be teamed with 
another contracting professional on a source selection.  They could also be provided 
additional training and on-the-job testing.  Persistent protest magnets could also be 
reassigned to a post-award contracting role.  Further research is needed to explain the 
underlying reason for this finding before definitive implications can be made.  Hence, 
correlations to other variables such as assignments to high-value, highly-critical source 
selections must be ruled out.      
The data reveals that the LPTA source selection method is sometimes used to 
source requirements that are inappropriate to the buying situation.  Nevertheless, its 
use showed no statistical effect on mitigating protests.  Awarding more contracts than 
intended has also been mentioned as a strategy to avoid protests.  Likewise, doing so 
showed no statistical effect on mitigating protests.  Thus, no recommendations are 
made with respect to using these strategies as means to reduce protest. However, if 
expecting to avoid a protest solely by using an LPTA source selection method, 
acquisition leaders might reconsider.    
This research also confirms the deliberate use of acquisition vehicles in order to 
circumvent the more stringent, protest-prone FAR Part 15 source selections.  
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Contracting officers reported substantial use of task/delivery orders, sole source 
contracts, and modifications to existing contracts as means to avoid protests.  This 
means that many firms have been unfairly eliminated from an opportunity to win 
government contracts, and, absent intervention, will likely continue to be affected.  
Acquisition leaders should identify the barriers to FAR Part 15 source selections, and 
develop means to navigate them more efficiently and effectively.  Acquisition leaders 
should also keep a pulse on the impacts to competition and small businesses.   
The transaction costs of source selections is alarmingly high, averaging 243 
thousand dollars each, or 6.6% of contract spend.  These costs represent the labor 
effort and grade of assigned source selection team members.  They have been linked to 
fear of protest (Hawkins et al., 2016).  In other words, the threat of protests causes 
greater effort (i.e., transaction costs) to prevent a protest.  This effect is manifested in 
the greater quantity of document revisions.  Previous research examined the utility of 
bid protests and concluded, surprisingly without measuring costs and benefits, that 
protests are worth the costs (Gordon, 2013).  This research adds to the discourse a 
quantified assessment of costs, but quantified benefits remain an opportunity for future 
research.  The prime question remains whether the procedural justice afforded by 
protests is worth the high transaction costs of source selections.  Another question can 
be raised – can the fairness of source selections be preserved while transaction costs 
are reduced?  Additionally, transaction costs measured differently - as FTEs (i.e., 
excluding salaries) - reduce the odds of a protest.  Thus, for procurements with features 
indicating a protest such as high-value, highly critical services, acquisition leaders can 
add human resources to the source selection team to lower the odds of a protest.  
Nevertheless, this research also found that document revisions actually increase the 
odds of receiving a protest.  Logically, iterations of edits should result in improvements 
and fewer mistakes, but the opposite appears to be true.  Acquisition leaders should, 
therefore, seek means to reduce document iterations.  Standardization and automation 
of document writing and reviewing might reduce the number of seemingly needed 
revisions.  Increasing the competence of each source selection team member might 
also help reduce the perceived need to revise documents.  Reducing the number of 
different people involved in reviews might also reduce inconsistency across documents.  
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Nevertheless, more research is needed to further explore the precise underlying 
reason(s) that document revisions relate to increased odds of a protest.   
A common way that service providers have been able to mitigate transaction 
costs while standardizing service levels and service quality is to standardize the service.  
This standardization is coupled with automation.  For example, even complex offerings 
such as auto insurance can be procured online without human intervention on the sales 
side.  Government buying agencies or commercial software companies could consider 
developing software with artificial intelligence to standardize evaluations, ratings, and 
tradeoffs to ensure proposal evaluation inconsistencies are eliminated, and prior bases 
of protests have been avoided.   
Theoretical Implications 
Perhaps most importantly, this research shines light on an overlooked corner of 
justice theory – communications during relationship formation (i.e., source selection).  
This is important; much of the precedent of relational norms are established during the 
interactions during supplier selection.  Evidence of the value of pre-award 
communication is found in this research; oral presentations decrease the odds of a 
protest. Understanding how they do so is important, and theories such as justice and 
relational exchange can guide investigations.  Perhaps nonverbal communication allows 
offerors to gauge the extent that the buyer is genuinely interested in the offeror’s fair 
treatment and chance of securing the business.  Relatedly, what also has not been 
explored is any lingering impact of extreme or otherwise influential (in)justices in the 
past and how those (in)justices manifest themselves in future interactions, decisions, 
and behaviors.   
Another aspect of justice theory that has heretofore been overlooked is the 
perspective of whose justice takes priority.  Certainly the buyer perceives a right to 
efficiently choose the supplier believed to offer the best chance of satisfying the buyer’s 
needs.  How just is a delay to the government’s mission?  To the taxpayer, how just is 
spending 77 percent more on arriving at a selection decision than on the service being 
procured – as one record demonstrates in this research.  On the other hand, the market 
and the taxpaying public claim entitlement to fair opportunity and to the careful 
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expenditure of funds, respectively.  How just is telling the market one set of evaluation 
criteria, then applying another unspoken one?   How just is a selection decision based 
on a buyer’s error?  Is there a reasonable cost threshold on justice?  At what point does 
the cost of justice become unjust?   
Study Limitations 
This research is not without limitations.  First, the response rate from the original 
data collection was low.  A low response rate calls into question the external validity 
(i.e., generalizability) of the results and raises suspicion of systematic response biases.    
While the response rate is low, it is not uncommon in business research (Melnyk et al., 
2012).  Second, the variables available in the data set do not include all possible causes 
of a protest.  For instance, the extent that errors were made is not measured for each 
source selection.  But, unless a protest is received, respondents will likely not be 
cognizant of their errors.  Additionally, the admission of errors might be tainted by 
socially desirable response bias.  Another relevant data element not available is the 
number of offers received; more offers should increase the probability of a protest.  
Nevertheless, by including transaction costs, the data did include a proxy of efforts to 
prevent errors.  Omitted variables likely accounts for the low accuracy of classification of 
protest cases in the model.  Additionally, one perceptual measure, source selection 
method appropriateness, was measured with a single-item scale precluding the 
assessment of its reliability.  Another weakness of the logistic regression model is the 
distribution of the dependent variable responses.  Of 240 records, only 43 were 
protested, which is not well balanced in levels of the dependent variable. 
Future Research Directions 
Future research should confirm in a separate sample the effects found in this 
exploratory research.  Of particular interest worthy of more in-depth attention is the 
contribution of oral presentations to justice perceptions.  A better understanding of how 
oral presentations are conducted and whether such characteristics are meaningful in 
terms of contract outcomes and bid protests. Specifically, the media employed (i.e., 
face-to-face, telephone, video conference, or written), the characteristics of attendees, 
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and the content of information disclosed should be examined for any unique effects.  
Additionally, research should explore the extent of two-way dialogue in oral 
presentations given the restrictions on communications and the risk of opening 
discussions.  Also, under what conditions are oral presentations employed?  Under 
what conditions should they be employed?  Why are they not used more often? Further 
research could explore what value is gained from constrained oral presentations in 
which discussions are not opened, and further, how oral presentations are conducted.   
Conclusion 
This research offers a first step toward quantitative, transaction-level 
investigation into reasons for bid protests.  While no one can prevent an interested party 
from filing a bid protest (Rumbaugh, 2010), the factors identified herein can help 
acquisition managers hedge against the likelihood.  This research implicates the 
importance of criticality of the procured item or service, services (versus goods), oral 
presentations, protest fear, protest experience, and cost reimbursement contracts in 
receiving a bid protest. These exploratory findings suggest useful directions for future 
research into this nascent stream of investigation.   
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Lead Time  
PALT1* The milestones for awarding this contract were too aggressive. 
 
PALT2* I was not rushed to award this contract. 
 




CTE2* At least one technical evaluator expressed concern about not being 
able to say what needs to be said in the technical evaluation. 
 
CTE3* At least one technical evaluator was concerned that the constraints 
imposed on their evaluations impeded his/her ability to write a 
meaningful evaluation. 
 
CTE6* Upon evaluation of proposals, at least one technical evaluator 
expressed a need to change at least one evaluation criterion or its 
definition. 
Criticality  
CRIT2* This requirement supported a core competency of our customer’s 
organization. 
 
Label Scale question 
Protest Fear  
FEAR1* At some point during the development of the acquisition strategy or 
the source selection process, I worried about receiving a bid protest. 
FEAR2* I was concerned that the contract award would be protested 
FEAR3* I was anxious to get beyond the 10-day point after contract award (or 
debriefings) to determine whether or not the contract would be 
protested. 
FEAR5** During the development of the acquisition strategy and throughout 
proposal evaluation, to what extent were you concerned that an 
offeror might protest the contract award? 
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An unsuccessful outcome of the RFP would have had only minor 




ACQSTAPP1* Our acquisition strategy was the best means to source our 
requirement. 
ACQSTAPP 2* Our acquisition strategy was the best means to achieve our 
acquisition objectives. 
 
ACQSTAPP 3* It would have been difficult to achieve our goals without the use of our 
acquisition strategy. 
ACQSTAPP 4* The source selection method we used (i.e., LPTA, full-tradeoff, or 
PPT) was the most appropriate for this requirement. 
 
ACQSTAPP 5* Our acquisition strategy ensured we selected the best offeror. 
ACQSTAPP 6* Our acquisition strategy provided the best fit to the buying situation 
(e.g., complexity, dollar value, acquisition objectives, contract length, 
performance risk, criticality to the mission, availability of supply, time 
available to award a contract, etc.). 
 
Protest Risk  
PR1 Increased costs to settle a terminated contract(s) 




PR4 Increase in workload to resolve the protest. 
 
PR5 Career repercussions for making a mistake or omission that caused a 
bid protest.  
 






Rate the appropriateness of the source selection method for the requirement on a 
scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “completely inappropriate” and 7 represents 
“completely appropriate.”  Appropriate, in this context, means the source selection 
method is the best fit to the buying situation (e.g., complexity, dollar value, 
acquisition objectives, contract length, performance risk, criticality to the mission, 
availability of supply, time available to award a contract, etc.). 
 *anchors strongly agree and strongly disagree 
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